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Abstract 
 
Studies of EU enlargement generally take as their subject the motivations for a 
country’s accession; rarely do they analyse in great detail any of the steps in the 
process itself. My contribution to the literature is an analysis of DG Enlargement in its 
role as a boundary spanner during the pre-accession period.  
 
One of the key boundary-spanning tasks exercised by the DG is to provide 
information about the organisation, its operations, and its management to the 
external environment. To answer the questions to what extent DG Enlargement can 
be characterised as a boundary spanner, and how the relevance of this 
characterisation might have changed over time, I examine DG Enlargement’s 
performance during the 2004 enlargement round and the critical self-assessment it 
undertook thereafter to determine whether lessons learnt have resulted in changed 
behaviour. In order to maximise evidence of boundary-spanning behaviour, I have 
chosen DG Enlargement’s management of the Copenhagen criterion of minority 
rights protection as my case study: with the condition absent from the acquis, DG 
ELARG must persuade membership aspirants to adopt this norm by other means. 
 
I will argue that DG Enlargement did act as a boundary spanner during the 2004 
enlargement round, but that its assimilation of lessons learned has not dramatically 
affected its current behaviour. Despite disseminating the findings of its internal 
evaluations widely throughout the EU, political unwillingness to come to an 
agreement on common standards of minority rights protection prevents DG ELARG 
from improving its performance other than at the margins. 
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1.  Introduction: DG Enlargement and minority rights protection 
The Directorate-General for Enlargement, like the Roman deity Janus, is the guardian 
of the gates to the EU. Like Janus, the DG faces two directions: inward to the EU as it 
currently is, and outward to the EU as it will one day become. And like Janus, DG 
Enlargement symbolises change and transition, at times pushing the gates outward 
so that the worthy fall within them. 
 
DG Enlargement’s institutional position at the boundary separating the internal from 
the external warrants careful study. This unique status should, in theory, afford the DG 
great power: its officials’ external action brings with it information that can improve 
internal decision-making. Most of this data establishes candidate states’ fitness for 
integration into the EU and membership of an “area of peace, stability, and 
democracy in our continent”.1 
 
My research will focus on one of the measurements of this fitness, one – because not 
fully honoured – that has created a situation where a considerable number of the 
EU’s new citizens do not benefit from the area of peace, stability, and democracy so 
recently expanded to include them. I write of the final political criterion enunciated 
in the 1993 Copenhagen European Council conclusions, namely that “membership 
requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing […] respect for and protection of minorities”.2 
 
The EU’s approach to this condition merits close attention, for any future 
enlargement 3  will extend membership to states comprising sizeable minority 
populations. Balkan states present perhaps the most difficult challenge, founded as 
they were in the ruins of Yugoslavia on Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty.4 If 
the EU were found to have applied minority rights conditionality only half-heartedly 
during enlargements past, consistent (mis)application would bode ill for the future of 
the ethnically heterogeneous states queuing for membership.  
 
My analysis thus focuses on the Directorate-General for Enlargement’s efforts to 
ensure fulfillment of the minority rights criterion during the 2004 enlargement round. 
Taking the Romani5 ethnic minorities in Slovakia and Slovenia as a case study, the 
DG’s performance will be analysed to identify the strengths and weaknesses of its 
                                                 
1  Commission of the European Communities, ‘Enlargement’,  European Union in the World, 
Brussels, 18 March 2007, retrieved 20 April 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/world/what/ 
enlargement/index_en.htm 
2 European Council, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’, Copenhagen, 21-22June 1993. 
3 With the exception of Icelandic accession. 
4  For a contextualisation of post-Yugoslav ethnic politics, see H. Poulton, The Balkans: 
Minorities and States in Conflict, London, Minority Rights Group, 1993; and M. Ignatieff, Blood 
and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, London, Vintage, 1994. 
5  The term ‘Roma’ will henceforward be used to refer to Romani peoples in question, 
irrespective of self-identification. This is done for simplicity’s sake rather than to deny the 
heterogeneity of the group.   
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modus operandi. Putative changes will be considered indicative of organisational 
learning, 6  permitting a response to the questions: To what extent can DG 
Enlargement be characterised as a boundary spanner, and how might the 
relevance of this characterisation have changed over time? 
 
I will argue that DG Enlargement did act as a boundary spanner during the 2004 
enlargement round, but that its assimilation of lessons learned has not dramatically 
affected its current behaviour. More precisely, my hypotheses are as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 1  The shallow foundation afforded minority rights in the acquis 
communautaire hinders DG Enlargement’s ability to effectuate 
objectively desirable changes in the minority rights regimes of 
candidates. 
HYPOTHESIS 2  The existence of other pan-European organisations dedicated to 
human and minority rights advocacy – the Council of Europe 
(CoE) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) – provides the DG a solution to this problem by 
offering ready-made surrogate standards. 
HYPOTHESIS 3  DG Enlargement and its external intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental interlocutors must, for want of resources, foster 
synergies with one another to achieve desired ends. 
 
In the second chapter of my thesis, I establish the definitions of and assumptions 
underlying concepts of organisations, organisational behaviour, learning, internal 
evaluation, and boundary spanners. By marrying these concepts, I develop a 
theoretical lens through which to analyse DG Enlargement’s efforts to manage the 
minority rights criterion. 
 
The third chapter is an in-depth examination of the international and Community 
acts dealing with the protection of minority rights. As these texts are unsatisfactory, 
DG Enlargement must act with a wide range of actors in the external environment to 
secure the protection of and respect for minorities upon which membership is 
conditional. The argument that this interference is necessary will be pursued in the 
fourth chapter, where I examine the DG’s performance during the 2004 enlargement 
round. Its practices are described and analysed in considerable detail in an attempt 
to isolate the positive and negative aspects of its approach. 
 
My fifth chapter reviews the internal evaluations conducted by the organisation and 
the changes they encouraged within the operations of the DG and the EU more 
generally. The conclusions establish that, although the DG itself has made relatively 
minor changes in its assessment process, the minority rights criterion remains subject 
to interpretation and thus invites politically expedient judgment. 
                                                 
6 D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, ‘Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer 
Literature’, Political Studies, XLIV, 1996, p. 346. 
  5 André Ghione 
2.    Theoretical framework: Organisations, learning, and the concept of 
boundary spanning 
In this first chapter, I expound the definitions of and assumptions underlying key 
concepts. I then establish their relevance in the EU context and their implications for 
the analysis to follow.  
2.1  Definitions and assumptions 
The literature whence these definitions are derived is geared in the main to business 
management studies. Nevertheless, I believe the insight they provide outweighs 
concerns regarding a departure from traditional International Relations literature. 
International Relations theory seeks to explain cooperation between states rather 
than between institutions. Historical institutionalism and its concept of path 
dependency may gain currency if and when subsequent enlargement rounds 
provide additional cases for study. But, here again, we are faced with a theory that 
accounts for neither the process of learning nor its consequent assimilation. I hope to 
fill these lacunae in what follows. 
Organisations 
An organisation is both an articulated purpose and an established mechanism for 
achieving it.7 Organisations are assumed to continuously evaluate their purposes 
and to constantly modify and refine the mechanism by which they achieve them.8 
Evaluation examines output relative to internal and external expectations. The fact 
that any organisation’s survival depends upon the satisfaction of its clients9 is thought 
to incentivise careful and responsible management of tasks. 
 
Action undertaken by an organisation in its environment constitutes, at least in part, 
its behaviour. This behaviour is historically based: evaluation of past iterations, 
followed by modification of or refinements to the mechanism, influence future 
performance.  
 
Organisations function as holding environments for knowledge. Though such 
knowledge may be held solely in the minds of individual members, “it may also be 
held in an organization’s files, which record its actions, decisions, regulations and 
policies as well as in the maps, formal and informal, through which organizations 
make themselves understandable to themselves and others”.10  
 
                                                 
7  R.E.  Miles  et al., ‘Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process’, The Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1978, p. 457. 
8 Ibid. 
9  E.B.  Haas,  When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International 
Organizations, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1990, p. 30. 
10 C. Argyris and D.A. Schön, Organizational Learning II: Theory, Method, and Practice, New 
York, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1996, p. 12. 
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For the purposes of the current study, a final assumption must be added: contextual 
factors can act to moderate or reinforce organisational behaviour. Moderation and 
reinforcement can be either internal or external in character. For example, an 
organisation subsidiary of another might display many of the same characteristics, 
owing a broader organisational culture. Or an organisation might operate in an 
environment hotly contested by other organisations, and thus be limited in its scope 
for action.  
Boundary spanning 
Boundaries define organisations, separating the internal from the external. Boundary 
roles are those that link the organisation to the external environment.11 Boundary 
spanners exercise these roles. According to Böhling, a boundary spanner must 
•  be able to represent to other members of the organisation the expectations, 
preferences, values, and norms of external groups; 
•  protect the organisational core from information overload and contribute to 
adjustment and renewal in the organisation by making it aware of new 
developments in the environment; and 
•  provide information about the organisation, its operations, and its 
management to the external environment.12 
Improper management of any of these tasks damages the channels of 
communication between the organisation and its environment, undermining its 
information-gathering capabilities and rendering adjustment unlikely. This, in turn, 
jeopardises performance-enhancing changes to the organisational modus 
operandi, prompting questions among clients about the responsiveness of the 
organisation to new challenges and thus about its continued viability. 
 
How much autonomy a boundary spanner enjoys is contingent upon several factors: 
the level of influence that other internal functions have on decision-making 
discretion; the level of experience, competence, and power accumulated over 
time; and the degree to which the organisational culture socialises boundary 
spanners to internalise goals and values.13 Where the boundary-spanning role is 
exercised by an organisation subsidiary of another, we can expect a reduction in 
autonomy: highly complex relations within the broader organisation will doubtless 
impinge on decision-making discretion.  
 
                                                 
11  H. Aldrich and D.  Herker, ‘Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure’, The 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1977, p. 217. 
12 K. Böhling, Opening up the Black Box: Organizational Learning in the European Commission, 
Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2007, pp. 26-27. 
13 V. Perrone, A. Zaheer and B. McEvily, ‘Free to Be Trusted? Organizational Constraints on Trust 
in Boundary Spanners’, Organization Science, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2003, p. 426. 
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Whatever the relative autonomy granted the boundary spanner in a particular 
organisational framework, its power should not be discounted. In the words of Aldrich 
and Herker, 
The organization […] relies upon the expertise and discretion of 
its boundary role personnel. They have a gatekeeper’s power, 
and may become even more powerful if they make correct 
inferences and if the information is vital for organizational 
survival.14 
One advantage of characterising a subsidiary as an organisation à part is that it 
allows for the self-interested exercise of power. Where the subsidiary is the sole 
boundary-spanning unit of a broader organisation, the tendency to abuse its 
dominant position occurs almost incidentally.  
 
In its interactions with the external environment, the boundary spanner should 
identify possible synergies between its parent organisation and others pursuing similar 
objectives. Noble and Jones conclude that organisations from the same sector are 
more likely to establish synergies, in part because the similarities between 
organisational cultures facilitate mutual understanding and foster mutual trust.15 That 
said, boundary spanners would fail in their duties were they to circumvent interested 
external groups for reasons of expediency. Organisations in new environments can 
thus be expected to be more highly sensitive than would otherwise be the case. 
DG ELARG as boundary spanner 
In practice if not in law, the European Commission acts as principal interlocutor with 
the candidate states and influences both the content and shape of the 
enlargement process. 16  The traditional focus of enlargement has been the 
incorporation of the acquis communautaire into domestic law by the membership 
aspirant. As the Commission was already responsible for monitoring compliance on 
transposition and implementation within the EU, it was thought the ideal institutional 
actor to advise on and interpret the acquis.17 This parallels Bulmer and Padgett’s 
hierarchical mode of governance, whereby EU institutions exercise supranational 
authority in fields for which they are exclusively competent, leading to policy 
transfer.18 Transfer potential will be maximised in Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) jurisprudence; it will be weakened in secondary legislation where the 
Commission and the CJEU supervise transposition and implementation in the 
Member States.19  
                                                 
14 Aldrich and Herker, op.cit., p. 227. 
15 G. Noble and R. Jones, ‘The Role of Boundary-Spanning Managers in the Establishment of 
Public-Private Partnerships’, Public Administration, Vol.84, No.4, 2006, p. 892. 
16 J.  O’Brennan,  The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, New York and London, 
Routledge, 2006, p. 56. 
17 Ibid., p. 75. 
18  S.  Bulmer  and  S.  Padgett, ‘Policy Transfer in the European Union: An Institutionalist 
Perspective’, Bristish Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, 2004, p. 104. 
19 Ibid, p. 112. 
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I submit that the relative success of the Commission’s management of enlargement 
is subject to similar conditions. DG ELARG personnel elucidate the finer points of the 
acquis to membership aspirants and provide targeted aid to spur its implementation, 
fostering a broader comprehension of the EU’s institutional framework. 
Simultaneously – and in conformity with the boundary spanning framework – they 
represent to the EU the expectations and preferences of candidate governments.20  
 
Note, however, that the Union’s norms and values are non-negotiable: demonstrable 
adherence to these last on the part of candidates are a sine qua non of 
membership.  Insofar as these norms and values are constitutionalised in the Treaties 
or referred to in secondary legislation, DG ELARG need only ensure transposition of 
the documents into domestic law. For values on which both the acquis and 
secondary legislation remain silent, DG ELARG must at once be more prescriptive in 
its communications with candidate governments and seek to collaborate with like-
minded international or regional organisations in the socialisation of future members.  
 
Subjective evaluations of candidates’ compliance with the membership criteria 
appear in the Commission’s Opinions and Regular Reports on Progress Towards 
Accession. Information gathered by Commission delegations on-site and country 
desk officers in DG ELARG is condensed and presented to the Union as a measure of 
the candidates’ readiness to assume the obligations of membership.  Because these 
documents influence opinion in the Council and the European Parliament, the 
decision to include or exclude certain data is the greatest exercise in power 
available to the DG given its structural position.21  
 
DG ELARG’s selective provision of information to the broader Commission and Union 
organisations raises important questions. Having posited the DG itself as an 
organisation, it is legitimate to ask whether DG ELARG provides information 
considered vital for its survival, or information considered vital for the survival of the 
Commission writ large.  
2.2  Tentative conclusions: Organisational learning in DG ELARG 
As I have termed the acquisition of information the main catalyst for learning, a 
predisposition to learning should stem from the DG’s role in its institutional as well as its 
external environment. A comparison of cases within the 2004 enlargement and 
subsequent self-evaluation will serve to judge whether DG ELARG’s task performance 
as a boundary spanner should improve over time via instrumentalisation of lessons 
learned. 
 
                                                 
20 O’Brennan, op.cit., p. 79. 
21 Aldrich and Herker, loc.cit. 
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An orthodox, policy transfer interpretation of DG ELARG’s role is clearly 
unsatisfactory: the EU can and does promote change extending beyond the 
technical minutiae of the acquis. The prime examples are the political criteria 
introduced at the 1993 Copenhagen Council.22 Most of these changes, too, could 
be explained by ‘domestication’23 of legislation: most criteria were firmly established 
principles of Community law before enlargement and were constitutionalised with 
ratification of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam.  
 
Not so with the respect for and protection of minorities. Ensuring observance of a 
criterion existing outside the legal realm presents a challenge to DG ELARG, 
demanding full exercise of boundary-spanning roles. The DG must communicate to 
candidates the Union’s insistence on full compliance while acknowledging that 
candidates’ sensitivities to the issue do not differ significantly from those of certain 
Member States. Drafters of Opinions  and  Regular Reports on Progress Towards 
Accession highlight the value’s importance by including a section pertaining to it in 
each document. But action extends beyond mere documentation: DG ELARG has 
cultivated synergies with the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as international and local non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), to maximise its impact. 
 
Analysis will centre mainly on DG ELARG publications to establish the relative 
importance of minority rights protection in the conditionality hierarchy. The way the 
subject is framed will speak as much, if not more, to the importance accorded it by 
the organisation; it will also provide insight into organisational behaviour and the 
process of gathering and filtering information for wider consumption.  
 
The hybridised approach I will be applying to the study of DG ELARG’s organisational 
behaviour is entirely novel: any conclusions reached will necessarily be tentative, 
whether because of the cases I will examine or the policy field I am studying. This 
study should be seen less as an attempt at establishing a grand theory than as an 
attempt to add another explanatory variable to the study of the enlargement 
process. 
3.  ‘Respect for and protection of minorities’: What kind of political 
criterion? 
Three putatively pan-European organisations include minority rights within their 
purview: the CoE, which has been working for their guarantee since its founding in 
1949; the OSCE, which has been committed to improving the conditions of minorities 
since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975; and the EU, whose focus on minority 
                                                 
22 European Council, loc.cit. 
23 Bulmer and Padgett, op.cit., p. 108. 
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rights dates at least24 from their inclusion in the Copenhagen European Council 
Conclusions of 1993.  
 
Overlap would not much matter were inter-institutional harmonisation easily 
achievable. This, however, is not yet the case, with some long-time Member States 
h a v i n g  f a i l e d  t o  s i g n  a n d / o r  r a t i f y  C o E  d o c u m e n t s  j u d g e d  l e g i s l a t i v e  g a u g e s  o f  
commitment to minority rights protection. The challenges for DG Enlargement as a 
boundary-spanning unit within the Commission are, first, to rationalise the perceived 
contradictions in the EU’s approach to minorities and second, to strengthen the 
nascent interorganisational networks it has developed with the CoE and OSCE to 
ensure achievement of their common goal.25 
 
This chapter will examine the international agreements to which adherence is 
viewed by the EU as evidence of minority rights protection. The EU’s own provisions 
for minority rights will then be analysed to highlight their inability to fill the gaps left by 
the agreements and to contextualise the tasks facing DG Enlargement as the 
Commission’s principal boundary spanning unit in the field. 
3.1  Necessary and sufficient? International minority rights legislation 
The EU views ratification of three international agreements as signifying compliance 
with the minority rights criterion: Article 27 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides the minimum standard; Articles 31 and 32 of the 
CSCE Copenhagen Declaration of 1990 specify the rights minorities should enjoy in a 
candidate country; and the CoE’s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM) serves as an additional reference document.26 As will be 
seen, this legislation is by no means unproblematic and leaves room for Community 
measures to bridge dangerous gaps in protection. 
 
Article 27 of the ICCPR reads, 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied 
the right, in community with the other members of their group, 
                                                 
24 Minority rights protection was an implicit precondition for membership under the tripartite 
Council-Commission-European Parliament Declaration on Human Rights of 1977 which 
required all candidates be parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 
1950. See J. Hughes and G. Sasse, ‘Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality 
and Minority Protection in the CEECs’, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 
1/2003, 2003, p. 9. 
25 On the functioning of such networks, see K. S. Cook, ‘Exchange and Power in Networks of 
Interorganizational Relations’, The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1977, pp. 62-82. 
26  F. Hoffmeister, ‘Changing requirements of membership’, in A. Ott and K. Inglis (eds.), 
Handbook on European Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement Process, The 
Hague, TMC Asser, 2002, pp. 95-96. 
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to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language.27 
 
Pressed for a definition of what the term ‘minority’ might be taken to mean in the 
context of this Article, Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti wrote, 
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a 
State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being 
nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the 
population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, 
directed towards preserving their culture, tradition, religion or 
language.28 
 
Both Article 27 and Capotorti’s definition are restrictive. Article 27 imposes a negative 
obligation on signatories; no policy promoting the rights of minorities need be 
undertaken. Capotorti’s definition fails to make the (admittedly nice) distinction 
between the ‘positive’ minorities he describes and what can be termed ‘negative’ 
minorities, constituted for the purpose of defending themselves against discriminatory 
treatment. 29  The immutability of these categories may be questioned: in the 
hypothetical case a signatory to Article 27 ICCPR fails to honour its obligation, what 
would otherwise have been a quiescent minority could fast become restive. 
 
Article 31 of the Copenhagen Declaration marks an improvement in minority rights 
protection, creating a positive obligation: “The participating States will adopt, where 
necessary, special measures for the purpose of ensuring to persons belonging to 
national minorities full equality with other citizens in the exercise and enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms”.30 Yet no prescription is made in this Article 
– nor, for that matter, in the remainder of the text – on constitutional questions 
regarding recognition of minorities. Dalton correctly argues that, due to a fear of 
separatist tendencies, “participating states will not surrender their right to decide 
between the range of policies open to them”.31 
 
Article 32, on self-identification, is crucially important: “To belong to a national 
minority is a matter of a person’s individual choice and no disadvantage may arise 
                                                 
27 ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, Geneva, Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, retrieved 20 April 2009, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm 
28 F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, New York, United Nations, 1979, p. 96. 
29  J .  P a c k e r ,  ‘ O n  t h e  C o n t e n t  o f  M i n o r i t y  R i g h t s ’ ,  i n  J .  R ä i k k a  ( e d . ) ,  Do We Need Minority 
Rights? Conceptual Issues, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996, p. 124. 
30  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,  Document of the Copenhagen 
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, June 1990. 
31 R. Dalton, ‘The Role of the CSCE’, in H. Miall (ed.), Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope for a 
Transnational Regime, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994, p. 106. 
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from the exercise of such choice”.32 Where discrimination is deeply rooted, one notes 
a tendency for persons to forego this choice and instead identify with a group free 
from persecution.  Only if no d isadvantage arises from his choice will a person be 
likely to identify himself with his minority culture and contribute to its promotion.  
 
In keeping with the documents reviewed above, the FCNM re-iterates the special 
needs of minorities while demonstrating a lack of agreement on measures of 
implementation. 33  Also worrying, as far as the elimination of discrimination is 
concerned, is the repeated emphasis on national minorities as opposed to minorities 
tout court. This has the perverse effect of privileging those individuals self-identifying 
with national minority groups while providing little or no protection to others. When in 
the preamble the FCNM states, “that the upheavals of European history have shown 
that the protection of national minorities is essential to stability, democratic security 
and peace in this continent”,34 it is reflecting the views of the signatory states—most 
of whom have diasporas abroad they would like to protect—rather than those of the 
non-national minorities arguably most in need of the mooted protections. 
3.2  Minorities in the Community legal order 
Until the formulation of the Copenhagen criteria the EU can be characterised as 
having been uninterested in the matter. This stems partly from the lukewarm 
reception of the instruments detailed above on the part of several Member States: 
France, arguing incompatibility with Article 2 of its constitution, has declared Article 
27 ICCPR inapplicable and has not signed the FCNM; Belgium, Greece, and 
Luxembourg all have yet to ratify it. Furthermore, as Vizi argues, the Union in the 
conduct of its business and the CJEU in its jurisprudence have always adopted an 
individualistic approach to human rights.35  
The end of the Cold War as fountainhead 
Realist International Relations theory argues that the ‘straitjacket’ of the Cold War 
afforded the EC/EU the luxury of avoiding uncomfortable questions inessential to the 
proper functioning of the Community. Only with the end of the Cold War and the 
advent of “a new world” which “seemed to herald the return of self-help attitudes”36 
                                                 
32 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, loc.cit. 
33 O. De Schutter, ‘The Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities and 
the Law of the European Union’, in A. Verstichel et al. (eds.), The Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities: A Useful Pan-European Instrument?, Antwerp, Intersentia, 
2008, p. 262. 
34 Council  of  Europe,  Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and 
Explanatory Report. Strasbourg, February 1995. 
35 B. Vizi, ‘An unintended legal backlash of enlargement? The inclusion of minority rights in the 
EU Constitutional Treaty’, Central and Eastern European Online Library, 1/2005, 2005, p. 99. 
36 J. O’Brennan, ‘“Bringing Geopolitics Back In”: Exploring the Security Dimension of the 2004 
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 
19, No. 1, 2006, pp. 156-157. 
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did the EU focus its attention on the conditions of minorities. In retrospect, fratricidal 
war and state failure in Yugoslavia marked a seminal moment. As O’Brennan writes,  
The disturbing legacy of European history meant the potential 
re-emergence of irredentism, and the presence of sizeable 
minorities in many of the new states left many fearful that the 
Yugoslav imbroglio rather than the relative harmony of the EU 
model was the template for the future.37 
As each of the new states voiced its desire to join the EU, it was understandable that 
‘respect for and protection of minorities’ would be included among the political 
criteria: the EU wished to deter admission of immature democracies prey to petty 
nationalisms and extremist political parties. So the 1993 Copenhagen European 
C o u n c i l  d e c l a r e d  i t s e l f  i n  f a v o u r  o f  t h e  F r e n c h  p r o p o s a l  f o r  a  p a c t  o n  s t a b i l i t y  i n  
Europe, “directed towards assuring in practice the application of the principles 
agreed by European countries with regard to respect for borders and rights of 
minorities”.38  
Non-national minorities 
The fate of non-national minorities remained undecided, however. In the absence of 
kin-state advocacy these groups pursued their claims via other organisms, such as 
NGOs and individual cases before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Prospective EU accession provided another avenue for redress. If the EU were to insist 
upon a political criterion that, consciously or not, failed to insert the ‘national’ 
qualifier before minorities, these groups could reasonably expect amelioration of 
treatment. 
 
The Romani populations of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) 
provided the most striking example of social exclusion and discrimination. There are 
approximately 10 million Roma in Europe as a whole; the 2004 enlargement saw the 
Romani population of the EU increase by 1.5 million,39 followed by an additional 2.2 
million40 with the Bulgarian and Romanian accessions in 2007. As a transnational 
minority claiming linguistic, religious, and cultural rights, a simple examination of their 
rights through the lens of securitisation was impossible; the legitimacy of Romani 
demands and the real danger they would go unmet challenged the EU’s self-
definition as an area of peace, stability and democracy. 
 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 57. 
38 European Council, loc.cit. 
39  Directorate-General Employment and Social Affairs of the Commission of the European 
Communities, The Situation of the Roma in an Enlarged European Union, Luxembourg, Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004, p. 6. 
40 A. Tanner, ‘The Roma of Eastern Europe: Still Searching for Inclusion’, Migration Information 
Source, 2005, retrieved 9 May 2009, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/ 
display.cfm?ID=308 
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Considerable attention was therefore paid to the plight of the Roma during the 
enlargement process. 41 In so doing, the EU assumed the functions traditionally 
exercised by kin-states. I wish to determine whether this attention affected positive 
change in the populations’ treatment. One would expect this to have been the case 
as candidates worked to satisfy all criteria for membership.  Yet it cannot have been 
taken for granted, as the analysis of international legal documents and Community 
legislation has shown. There remained synergies to be established and strategies to 
be devised, tailored to the exigencies of Romani populations in individual countries. 
4.  A first attempt at boundary spanning: DG ELARG, Romani rights, and the 
2004 enlargement round 
In this chapter, I analyse DG ELARG’s performance as a boundary spanner in the 
field of minority rights during the 2004 enlargement round. A brief description of the 
enlargement process up to the establishment of the DG in 1999 is provided, in which I 
identify certain intrinsic advantages accruing to the organisation from its institutional 
position. I then study the cases of Slovakia and Slovenia, charting evolving 
organisational responses to particular challenges. I chose these countries for their 
historical, political and geographical similarities: both are relatively ‘young’ post-
Communist states, having achieved independence in the early 1990s; both aspire to 
be nation-states despite the heterogeneity of their populations; and both are home 
to established Romani populations by virtue of their location in Central Europe.  
4.1  Finding its feet: The Commission and the CEECs pre-1999 
When in 1989 President Jacques Delors accepted on behalf of the Commission the 
task of coordinating aid from the G24 to the CEECs, he wittingly established the 
centrality of that institution to the future EC/EU-CEEC relationship.  Phare (Pologne-
Hongrie: Assistance à la Restructuration des Économies), the Community’s own 
programme for technical assistance, was placed under the remit of a new service in 
the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG I). 42 At the insistence of the 
European Parliament, a ‘democracy’ line focusing on politics and civil society was 
inserted into the general budget for 1992. Owing shortages of in-house staff and 
expertise, outside bodies and groups served as advisers and intermediaries.43 
 
Important lessons were drawn from these early experiences. First, the need for 
specialised, Brussels-based personnel became clear as the EC/EU-CEEC relationship 
grew in complexity. Second, coordination with external organisations – whether 
those associated with the G24 or civil society groups operating independently on the 
                                                 
41 A. Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony, New York, Oxford University Press, 
2004, p. 71. 
42 U. Sedelmeier and H. Wallace, ‘Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?’, in H. 
Wallace and W.  Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2000, 4th edn, p. 433. 
43 Ibid., pp. 433-434. 
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ground – added considerable value to Community efforts, whatever the difficulty of 
achieving it. Finally, information provided by EC field delegations was indispensable 
in targeting assistance properly. 
 
This learning had been instrumentalised by the time the Prodi Commission took office 
on 13 September 1999 with a Directorate-General for Enlargement. The 
establishment of the new DG constituted the birth of an organisation with 
enlargement as its articulated purpose and possessing all the mechanisms required 
to ensure task completion. It is important to remember that this organisation was not 
created ex nihilo: the Phare programme’s administrators from what had been DG I 
shifted to DG ELARG, ensuring continuity in personnel and the formation of a hard 
core of experience. Insofar as their previous work had sensitised them to candidates’ 
wants and needs, one could argue they represented the expertise unavailable to 
the Commission when it began its work with the CEECs in 1989; insofar as their 
previous work had socialised them to internalise the Commission’s goals and values, 
one could expect their task performance to showcase them.  
4.2  Slovakia 
Slovakia presented arguably the greatest test of DG ELARG’s mettle vis-à-vis the 
Copenhagen criteria and minority rights in particular. For one, the Slovak Constitution 
reflects an ethnic conception of the nation, distinguishing clearly between the 
“Slovak nation” and “national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of 
the Slovak Republic”. 44  Though recognised as citizens, persons belonging to 
minorities are conceived as different from the members of the national community 
for which the state is established. 
                                                
 
Toxic inter-ethnic relations marked post-independence Slovak political culture. 
Following the ‘Velvet Divorce’, then-Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar openly 
encouraged xenophobic attacks on Romani settlements, stating “[I]f we don’t deal 
with them, they will deal with us”.45 Nationalist mobilisation also targeted the 650,000-
person Hungarian minority, with a regressive language law passed in 1995 drawing 
Budapest’s ire and Brussels’ criticism. 
  
Bratislava’s indelicate treatment of minorities featured prominently in the 
Commission’s negative Opinion on the Slovak membership application, delivered in 
1997: 
 
44 J. Ringelheim, ‘Minority Protection and Constitution Recognition of Difference: Reflections 
on the Diversity of European Approaches’, in A.  Verstichtel  et al. (eds.), The Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: A Useful Pan-European Instrument?, 
Antwerp, Intersentia, 2008, pp. 47-48. 
45  Sourced from J. Rupnik, ‘Joining Europe together or separately? The implications of the 
Czecho-Slovak divorce for EU enlargement’, in J. Rupnik and J. Zielonka (eds.), The Road to 
the European Union. Vol. I: The Czech and Slovak Republics, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 2003, p. 29. 
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Improvement is […] required in the treatment of the Hungarian 
minority, which still does not benefit from the general law on the 
use of minority languages which the Slovak authorities have 
undertaken to introduce and for which there is provision in the 
Constitution. The position of the Roma (gypsies) also requires 
attention from the authorities.46 
 
Already we see DG-I officials acting as boundary spanners, alerting EU decision-
makers to the mismatch between constitutional provisions and laws adopted. 
Arguably more important was the Commission’s refusal to stand down from the 
minority rights criterion, though it made an example of Slovakia in the process by 
postponing accession negotiations. The Commission also attempted to foster 
synergies, upholding the recommendations of the OSCE’s High Commissioner for 
National Minorities and consequently enhancing that party’s prescriptive power.47 
  
Retarded progress towards EU accession proved a decisive factor in the Slovak 
public’s evaluation of the political system, as demonstrated by Mečiar’s 
replacement as prime minister by Mikuláš Dzurinda in October 1998. The leaders of 
the four parties constituting the governing coalition immediately sent a joint letter to 
the Commission, undertaking to accelerate integration with the EU and to fulfill the 
Copenhagen criteria as soon as possible.48  
  
With Dzurinda’s coalition promising required policy change, the Commission 
developed a more favourable view of the Slovak membership application. 
Important here was Prodi’s appointment of Verheugen as Commissioner for the 
newly created DG in 1999. A talented and powerful politician, Verheugen proved a 
strident advocate of an inclusive enlargement.49 This preference was well known to 
the Member States, who sometimes thought him a traitor in the ranks.50 This led DG 
ELARG to tergiversate in its conduct thereafter. While the organisation reflected the 
views of its champion and thus emphasised the positive and downplayed the 
negative aspects of applicants’ performances, it also advanced the arguments of its 
Member State clients. DG ELARG thus showed itself firmly committed to the project 
entrusted it, duly noting Member State and applicants’ concerns and working to 
reconcile all parties concerned to politically feasible compromises. 
Regular Reports as bi-directional communication 
With an eye to securing the inclusive enlargement it preferred, DG ELARG’s first 
Regular Report strove to rehabilitate the Slovak government’s image in the EU-15. 
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The DG stressed that Bratislava had launched programmes in co-operation with 
NGOs to support the education and integration of Roma children, and had adopted 
a strategy “to tackle the problems of the Roma community”.51 In contradistinction to 
the Commission’s lukewarm endorsement of the previous government’s “Plan for 
Solving Romany Problems”, DG ELARG qualified Dzurinda’s strategy as a positive 
development, notwithstanding its general character and lack of timetable. To 
expedite Slovakia’s progress, the DG provided a €4.3 million tranche of Phare 
funding dedicated to the “strengthening of civil society and policies and institutions 
protecting minorities rights”; a further allocation of €2 million was granted “to support 
activities for the Roma minority”.52 
 
Despite the Roma suffering “disproportionately high levels of poverty and 
unemployment, discrimination, violence at the hands of thugs (‘skinheads’) and lack 
of protection from the police”, DG ELARG’s general evaluation found that the 
changes effectuated since September 1998 fully satisfied the Copenhagen political 
criteria. 53  On aggregate, the DG’s judgment was correct: government began 
implementing the Basic Treaty with Hungary, setting up a Joint Committee for 
Minority Issues, and Parliament passed a Law on the Use of Minority Languages in 
Official Communications in July 1999. This improved the conditions of the numerically 
superior Hungarian minority, bringing national legislation “into conformity with the 
Slovak Constitution, applicable international standards and specific recommen-
dations from the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the European Commission”.54  
 
The DG availed itself of one of the few instruments at its disposal – Phare funding to 
Roma and NGOs – to promote Romani integration. The 1999 Accession Partnership 
for Slovakia represented the second-track of the DG’s strategy, committing the 
government in the short-term to “improv[ing] the situation of the Roma through 
strengthened implementation […] of measures aimed, notably, at fighting against 
discrimination, foster[ing] employment opportunities and increas[ing] access to 
education”. 55  Monitoring capacity was increased, and a greater degree of 
autonomy gained, as DG ELARG launched the first twinning programme in the field 
of Romani rights in 2000. 
 
The cumulative effect of these measures cemented the issue in Slovak political 
discourse. In 2000, the government launched a new, tiered Roma strategy, with more 
than 100 projects carried out by central and local governments in housing and 
infrastructure, education and training, employment, health and social affairs, and 
                                                 
51 Ibid., p. 18. 
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54 Commission of the European Communities, 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on 
Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession, op.cit., p. 17. 
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culture.56 A 2001 public works project highlighted DG ELARG’s contribution to the 
flowering of civil society: NGOs and religious organisations, working with local 
authorities, implemented a programme worth some €35 million from which Roma 
communities were main beneficiaries.57 That same year, the government appointed 
a Plenipotentiary for Roma affairs to liaise with the Romani community, the public, 
and the media. At a lower level, NGO-run training courses allowed Roma to visit 
state and public institutions, providing rudimentary though vitally necessary civics 
education.58  
  
DG ELARG’s final assessment of Slovakia’s preparations for membership spoke frankly 
of the grave situation faced by the Roma.59 By this point, the DG was no longer 
alerting the Union to development in its external environment; it was elucidating the 
challenges the Union would soon be importing into its internal environment. In stating 
that Slovakia “needs to make enhanced efforts in order to complete its preparations 
for accession” in, inter alia, the field of social policy and employment, 60  the 
candidate was encouraged to rush policy transfer rather than concentrate on its 
implementation. It would be up to other Commission DGs to adjust their policies to 
correct for window dressing. 
4.3  Slovenia 
Slovenia presented DG ELARG far fewer challenges than did Slovakia. This is partly 
attributable to demographics: Slovenia’s population is approximately half that of 
Slovakia, with no one minority group accounting for more than two per cent. 
Consequently, the government had little fear of irredentism. Rather, it drafted its 
Constitution in such a way as to ensure protection of its own minorities abroad. 
Article 5(1) states, 
In its own territory, the state shall protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. It shall protect and guarantee the rights 
of the autochthonous Italian and Hungarian national 
communities. It shall maintain concern for autochthonous 
Slovene national minorities in neighbouring countries and for 
Slovene emigrants and workers abroad and shall foster their 
contacts with the homeland.61 
Beyond the guarantees afforded autochthonous minorities from neighbouring states, 
Article 65 allows for “the status and special rights of the Romany Community living in 
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Slovenia” to be “regulated by law”.62 The government’s dogged refusal to do so was 
one of the few blemishes on Slovenia’s record. 
 
Commission documents drafted prior to the creation of DG ELARG speak to the 
state’s full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. Ljubljana’s activity in the field 
of minority rights, at least, was frenetic: in July 1997, the government signed the CoE’s 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; in March 1998 Parliament 
ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.63  
  
Roma were considered reasonably well treated, represented as they were on 
municipal councils of the towns they inhabited;64 state-funded programmes to help 
Romani communities were lauded. Granted, Roma were not fully integrated into the 
State, with severe underemployment the greatest concern.65 But they were not 
subject to the systematic persecution prevalent in other CEECs, and it was believed 
that modest domestic change could secure greater inclusion.  
Regular Reports as bi-directional communication 
As a member of the accession avant-garde, Slovenia’s image required no 
rehabilitation. The government had already signed up to most of the international 
legislation in the field of minority rights, obviating the need for DG ELARG to use its 
leverage for its institutional partners’ benefit. Even use of Phare Roma programmes 
was foregone: unlike the Accession Partnerships for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, the Accession Partnership for Slovenia did not 
specify the integration of Romani populations as a priority area. 
 
A s  i n  t h e  S l o v a k  c a s e ,  D G  E L A R G  f l a g g e d the mismatch between constitutional 
provisions and laws in force, highlighting Ljubljana’s failure to draft the general 
protection law foreseen by Article 65. ELARG officials intimated that, while such an 
omnibus law would be preferable, the sectoral legislation protecting the Roma was 
satisfactory.66 Improvements were, however, suggested: the DG called for a Roma 
registration drive to ensure the population’s representation in local government 
better reflected real numbers, and emphasis was placed on socio-economic 
integration in the areas of health, employment, and education. 
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In response, Ljubljana introduced a Programme on Equal Opportunities of 
Employment for the Roma in 2000. Its unhurried implementation and perceived short-
termism prompted Roma complaints to the Commission and a subsequent 
reprimand from the DG in its 2002 report. 67 Amendments to the Law on Local 
Government adopted in May 2002 were more successful, providing direct 
representation for the Roma in 20 municipalities. In tandem, the government 
earmarked additional funds for these localities in the 2003 budget “to implement 
policies benefiting the Roma population”.68  
 
Reference to the continued challenges faced by the Roma is conspicuous by its 
absence in DG ELARG’s final assessment of Slovenia’s preparations for membership.  
One surmises this omission reflects a disinclination to overload the Commission’s 
organisational core with repetitive information. 
4.4  Speaking to the prospective citizen 
On 9-10 December 2003, the Commission and the Project on Ethnic Relations held 
workshops with Romani leaders and government representatives from the CEECs. As 
expected of boundary-spanning activities, these workshops served a dual purpose: 
European officials received a first-hand assessment of policies from Roma in policy-
making positions; and Romani representatives received a picture of the EU’s extant 
policies and future approaches to Romani issues.69  
 
Arguably the most beneficial aspect of the workshops was a presentation of EU 
legislation, instruments and policies. On the legislative front, officials explicated 
Council Directive 2000/43/EC, known colloquially as the Race Equality Directive 
(RED). It was doubtless important that Roma be alerted to the possibility of bringing 
their governments to the CJEU should authorities act against the RED’s provisions, but 
the limits inherent in the Directive should also have been detailed.70  
 
ELARG officials then explained in broad terms the functioning of the Structural Funds, 
again encouraging Romani leaders to network with their governmental partners as 
well as the DGs responsible for administering funds. 
 
Finally, the structure of DG EMPL was explained. With four separate programmes on 
social inclusion, gender equality, anti-discrimination and employment incentives, this 
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DG would, upon accession, become the Commission’s primary interlocutor with the 
Roma.71  
4.5  General conclusions 
Since its inception, and largely by design, DG ELARG has exercised a boundary-
spanning function. That it found itself in a position of relative autonomy and power 
during the Eastern enlargement process was due in no small part to the inheritance 
of expert personnel from DG-I thoroughly inculcated with the broader organisational 
goals and values of the Commission and the routinisation of deliberative and 
consultative decision-making.  
 
As my study of the Slovak and Slovene cases has shown, these advantages were not 
themselves enough to guarantee effective boundary-spanning activity in the field of 
minority rights. I will briefly summarise DG ELARG’s performance in each of the roles 
enunciated above. 
 
•  Representation to other members of the organisation the expectations, 
preferences, and norms of other groups. Seeming inaction on this point is almost 
wholly attributable to the policy field. All Member States, the European 
Parliament, and the Commission were already cognisant of the normative 
preferences of the CoE and the OSCE. As the candidates were expected to 
exhibit the same preferences as and adhere to the norms of the EU, no 
representation was necessary.  
•  Protection of the organisational core from information overload and contribution 
to adjustment and renewal in the organisation by making it aware of new 
developments in the environment. Here DG ELARG performed admirably. The 
potential for overload was great, with information sourced from Commission 
delegations and parliamentary exchanges in addition to OSCE field offices, CoE 
reports, and feedback from international and local NGOs. In drafting its Regular 
Reports, the DG pored over this data and delivered to its internal clients only 
what information it deemed necessary. The rehabilitation of the Slovak 
application demonstrated the extent to which this practice was prey to the 
political preferences of project champions. On this point, the Slovak and Slovene 
Reports were polar opposites: DG ELARG painstakingly detailed Slovak progress 
while using boilerplate in its evaluations of Slovenia.  
•  Provision of information about the organisation, its operations, and its 
management to the external environment. DG ELARG provided ample 
information about the EU through daily contact with Slovene and Slovak officials; 
in the Slovak case, coordinated implementation of Phare Roma programmes 
demonstrated yet other processes, most notably those involving regional policy. 
As there were no Community minority rights standards to convey to these 
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governments, DG ELARG conveyed the EU’s wish that candidates ratify the legal 
instruments of its institutional partners.  
Whether and to what extent these experiences provoked a re-evaluation of DG 
ELARG’s conduct will be analysed in the following chapter. 
5.  Report cards and re-education: DG ELARG’s integration of internal 
evaluations 
To its credit, DG ELARG displayed a strong willingness to learn from its experience as 
an actor in the minority rights field during the 2004 enlargement round. In this 
c h a p t e r ,  I  w i l l  o u t l i n e  t h e  m a i n  p o l i c y  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  m a d e  b y  i n t e r n a l  a n d  
external clients to enhance the efficacy of the DG’s actions in support of minorities. I 
include evaluations conducted by DG ELARG as an organisation, by individual 
officials, and by the Commission more generally. Macro and micro level changes 
(i.e. at the Union and DG level) will then be examined in an attempt to locate 
instances of instrumental learning. 
5.1 Internal  evaluations 
Acting as a holding environment for knowledge, DG ELARG published, in 2003, a 
compendium of the achievements of the Phare Roma programmes targeting 
Romani populations in Central and Eastern Europe. This ex post policy impact 
assessment and supplementary interviews with practitioners provide great insight into 
the DG’s field approach and hints at issues perceived as sensitive by the 
organisation. A final internal document – DG EMPL’s Situation of Roma in an Enlarged 
European Union – highlights the persistence of marginalisation in newly acceded 
countries and advocates anti-discrimination measures to be taken at all levels of 
governance. An examination of each type of evaluation in turn provides a base for 
understanding what policy changes followed the 2004 enlargement round. 
Review of the European Union Phare Assistance to Roma Minorities 
Though its recommendations were aimed at the governments of Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, and DG EMPL in the Commission, this 
Review was not without constructive self-criticism. DG ELARG accepted its share of 
the blame for enabling governmental short-termism. To cite one example from the 
Slovak case, Phare allocated €8.3 million to a programme entitled ‘Infrastructure 
Support for Roma Settlements’.72 This, along with other infrastructure interventions in 
CEE, was characterised as counterproductive. DG ELARG advised against 
participation in top-down interventions in future Phare Roma programmes.73  
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The DG’s final recommendations trumpeted a holistic approach to Romani initiatives. 
ELARG officials had by now come to view all actors in the external environment as 
parts of an interrelated whole. DG ELARG was speaking to the future practices of its 
own personnel when it stressed that partnership working is neither natural nor 
spontaneous, but rather “an approach that needs to be managed, co-ordinated 
and also learned”.74 
Practitioner accounts 
All practitioners with whom I spoke agreed that in the absence of the political 
pressure exerted by the EU prior to Eastern enlargement, the situation of the Roma 
would have deteriorated. 75  They were also unanimous in acknowledging the 
imperfection of the process: if full integration had indeed been the objective, all 
post-enlargement reports testified to the EU’s failing to have met it.76  
 
Speaking to DG ELARG’s ability to affect political discourse, one interviewee stated, 
“Since Roma monitoring was included in the Regular Reports, politicians have been 
forced to commit to the population’s integration. Whether this trickles down to local 
levels is debatable, but a critical mass of commitments does have an impact”.77 Still, 
the absence of standards renders impossible any quantification of effects. 
Consequently, ELARG officials expressed frustration at judging whether or not 
programmes were designed simply to secure favourable reporting. 
 
ELARG officials viewed political leverage with respect to the Copenhagen political 
criteria as a finite resource. “The moment we confirmed full compliance was the 
moment we lost recourse. You couldn’t really be disqualified, after that”.78 There was 
a certain logic to this approach: strict application of the minority rights criterion to 
the Roma would have disqualified all Central and Eastern European applications. 
One interviewee put it thus: “Suspending negotiations over the treatment of Roma 
would not have been a principled stand; it would also have been an excuse for 
xenophobes to ramp up attacks. Blame would ultimately have been placed at their 
[the Romani minority’s] doorstep. ”79  
 
Most interesting were practitioners’ views of other actors in the external environment. 
Over the course of DG ELARG’s operations, a symbiotic relationship developed 
between the Commission, the CoE and the OSCE . The EU-15 as members of the CoE 
and OSCE accepted the DG’s deference to their recommendations. In return, the 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 Author’s interviews with DG ELARG officials, Brussels, 31 March – 2 April 2009. 
76 ‘Bottom of the heap’, The Economist, Brussels and Bucharest, 19 June 2008.  
77 Author’s interview with a DG ELARG official, Brussels, 31 March 2009. 
78 Author’s interview with a DG ELARG official, Brussels, 2 April 2009. 
79 Author’s interview with a DG ELARG official, Brussels, 1 April 2009. 
  24 EU Diplomacy Papers 7/2010 
CoE and OSCE received a fillip to their prescriptive powers as their norms were 
endorsed by what had become the principal European political organisation.  
5.2  An eager student? Organisational changes 
Internal evaluations conducted following Eastern enlargement prompted thoughtful 
consideration of policies across the EU’s fields of competence. Before detailing the 
changes implemented in DG ELARG’s modus operandi, I will comment briefly on EU-
level changes—or attempted changes—that should also affect the DG’s 
organisational behaviour in future. 
Macro level 
Several ambitious attempts to fill what had been identified as “the obtrusive gap 
between the EU’s external policies and internal commitments”80 were made during 
the Convention on the Future of Europe. The most logical proposal called for a 
reference to be made to minority rights protection among the basic principles of the 
Union, completing the process of Copenhagen criteria constitutionalisation 
launched with the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe enshrined the minority rights criterion 
in Community law in a manner consistent with the CJEU’s traditionally individualist 
application of human rights. Article I-2 reads 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail.81 
This clause survived the non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty as the new Article 
2 TEU of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
Contra Hughes and Sasse, we can tentatively conclude that new Member States 
with sophisticated legal frameworks for minority protection have provided the EU 
new momentum to elaborate its own common legal and political standards.82 With 
the Treaty of Lisbon now in force, an evaluation of the interpretations of the article by 
the Commission in its policy-making and the CJEU in its rulings will provide the basis 
for a more definitive judgment.  
 
A parallel re-commitment to existing anti-discrimination within the EU can also be 
discerned. The most significant development to this end was Council Regulation 
                                                 
80 Vizi, op.cit., p. 87. 
81 ‘The founding principles of the Union’, Europa – Gateway to the European Union, retrieved 
6 May 2009, http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/objectives_en.htm 
82 Hughes and Sasse, op.cit., p. 27. 
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168/2007 establishing a European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). As per the 
text of the Regulation, the FRA is mandated “to provide the relevant institutions and 
authorities of the Community and its Member States when implementing Community 
law with information, assistance and expertise on fundamental rights”.83 In calling for 
collaboration with the Council of Europe and for dialogue with civil society, the FRA 
adopted what had been observed to be important elements in DG ELARG’s 
boundary spanning work. The establishment of the FRA should aid that DG’s action in 
the field of minority rights in future: the Agency is open to the participation of 
candidate countries, “facilitating a gradual alignment of their legislation with 
Community law as well as the transfer of know-how and good practice”.84 
Micro level 
Several modalities of DG ELARG’s operations have altered since the conclusion of 
2004 enlargement round. While it continues to exercise each of Böhling’s three 
boundary-spanning roles,85 I submit that its relative autonomy and influence have 
diminished. This is partly a question of timing: current candidates lack the compelling 
narrative that hastened CEECs’ accession to the EU. With few Member States 
championing enlargement’s cause, and with “the contract of marriage between 27 
countries”86 in need of consolidation and reinforcement, the market for the DG’s 
services is decidedly bearish. The decision to bring both Enlargement and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy under the same tent in the Barroso II Commission 
could be interpreted as evidence of this. 
 
Member States have also shifted their view on conditionality. No longer does one-
time compliance with the Copenhagen criteria suffice: the opening and closing 
benchmarks for each negotiating chapter have stretched their application over the 
entire process. What influence and autonomy DG ELARG has lost in the current 
climate has thus partly been recouped in the longer term. 
 
A last change concerns the integration of the minority rights criterion into a 
negotiating chapter. Chapter 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) was created to 
ensure citizens’ fundamental rights are protected in all state jurisdictions, whatever 
their distance from urban centres. This addresses one of the known unknowns of 
practitioner reviews – whether high-level political commitments trickle down – by 
guaranteeing a homogeneous application of the law.  
                                                 
83 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Directive (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 Feburary 2007 
establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights’, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L 53, 22 February 2007, p. 2. 
84 Ibid., p. 3. 
85 Böhling, loc. cit. 
86  O. Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, ‘EU Enlargement five years on’, Prague 
International Conference, Prague, 1 May 2009, retrieved 9 May 2009, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/210&format=HTML&a
ged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 
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6.  Conclusion and future perspectives 
A now well-established institutional role as a boundary spanner has privileged 
organisational learning in DG ELARG. Through their immersion in the EU’s external 
environment, ELARG officials are privy to vast amounts of information about the 
relative success of EU programmes, policy challenges facing candidate 
governments, regional activities undertaken by international organisations, 
preferences and demands of civil society, and future citizens’ opinions on the Union 
and its future.  
 
The volume of information available to the DG can only increase with the passage of 
time as people inside and outside the EU engage with the enlargement process. And 
because the outsiders of today might be the insiders of tomorrow, DG ELARG is in the 
unenviable position of having to cater to the wants and needs of a wider clientele 
than most Commission DGs.  
 
I based my study on the assumption that isolating one element of DG ELARG’s 
external action – initiatives to ensure candidates’ compliance with the minority rights 
criterion with respect to Roma – would allow easy identification of lessons learned in 
the past and attendant changes in present behaviour. Based on my research, I can 
confidently conclude that DG ELARG has instrumentalised the lessons learned in 2004 
to the extent possible; the vicissitudes of politics can undermine even the best-laid 
plans.  
 
This bears directly on my second research question: How has this instrumentalisation 
affected DG ELARG’s subsequent actions? Given the paucity of more recent 
examples, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove instrumentalisation caused or 
influenced subsequent actions. If and when other states accede to the EU, an 
application of my methodology to their cases would prove instructive. 
 
The case studies from 2004 confirmed my hypotheses. DG ELARG could not itself 
foster change in the minority rights regimes of candidates, owing a lack of acquis 
support. So it borrowed norms from the CoE and OSCE and communicated them to 
candidates as those of the EU, spurring a temporary boost in ratification of 
international legal instruments. Other intergovernmental and most nongovernmental 
organisations attempted to foster synergies with DG ELARG to achieve the objective 
of social inclusion.  
 
Characterising the DG as a boundary-spanning organisation was innovative, and 
can prove fruitful to future analysts taking enlargement as their subject. One 
interesting avenue for research would be an examination of DG ELARG’s response to 
clients’ demands. My research found that Member States’ alarm at the leap in 
Romani asylum claims in the late 1990s was determinant in placing the Roma near 
the top in ELARG officials’ minority rights reports; it is an open question whether the 
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presence/absence of a policy champion, for example, holds equal weight. Another 
possible study could focus on the nature of DG ELARG’s boundary-spanning 
communications with individuals in candidate states and the EU itself, at once 
bringing Europe closer to the citizen and bringing citizens closer to Europe. 
 
My approach did suffer from its treatment of DG ELARG as a unitary actor. While it is 
true that the Commission delegation staffs in states negotiating enlargement did 
report the latest news and events back to DG ELARG in Brussels, they were also in 
continual contact with other relevant line DGs. Future researchers could treat the 
boundary-spanning role at a greater level of abstraction, substituting DG ELARG with 
the European Commission more generally.  
 
I conclude with a reflection on the future of transnational minorities in the EU. DG 
ELARG was forceful in pushing governments to develop programmes for Romani 
inclusion, with mixed results. It was most successful when these claims followed on 
those of other, numerically superior minorities. I indicate in my thesis that kin-state 
members of the EU are usually successful in securing extensive protection for ‘their’ 
minorities abroad. What will it take for a transnational minority to benefit similarly? 
With Turkey and its large Kurdish minority in the enlargement queue, this is not a trivial 
question. A solution must be found so that, although Janus might shed a tear looking 
to the past, he might smile looking to the future.  
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